Automatic encryption of stored messages

Mikhail T. mi+thun at
Wed Apr 28 11:06:05 EDT 2010

28.04.2010 04:27, Dan White написав(ла):
> On 27/04/10 10:40 -0400, Mikhail T. wrote:
>> Is there a way to encrypt all of the Cyrus' user-specific files on 
>> the  disk? So that somebody breaking in -- or stealing the server -- 
>> has no  access to the messages (and other data) unless a user's 
>> password is also  available?
> Interesting question! info-cyrus list is probably more appropriate for
> this question.
Having to subscribe to yet-another mailing list, just to be able to send 
an occasional question or idea, is a turn-off... If this is off-topic on 
this list, I'll just shut-up...
>>    * A user logs in using a pam-module, which creates a symlink such as
>> /tmp/cyruspw/user -> somehash(/salt/+/password/+/user/).
> The PAM requirement would force the use of saslauthd, and plaintext only
> authentication mechanisms, which potentially degrades the over-the-wire
> security between the client and server.
Whichever way the user's password (or some function thereof) is 
communicated to the server -- as long as the communicated string remains 
constant... Use of PAM is just a possible implementation idea -- a way 
to off-load some of the changes from the Cyrus' code into a separate 
little tree (that of the pam-module). The only degradation I can see is 
that the methods like OTP would no longer work... I don't think, this is 
a big loss, if the entire traffic is SSL-protected. But that's up to the 
> Another opt-in approach would be for users to encrypt all private 
> messages
> within the MUA using PGP/GPG.
That approach exists now, but requires each user and /all of their 
correspondents/ to set PGP for themselves. It also requires cooperation 
from MUA, of course. My way is purely on the server and transparent to 
the users.



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